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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CACHE \.TALLEY BANKING 
COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion, as Executor of the Last 
Will and Testainent of WII...-
_FORD F. BAl~GH, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CACHE COlTNTY POULTRY 
GROWER'S ---~SSOCIATION, 
a corporation, an d U T A H 
POULTRY & FARMERS CO-
OPERATIVE, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondent. 
Appellant's 
Brief 
Case No. 6860 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for the 
County of Cache. 
F I LHon.: .. arriner M. Morrison, Judge . ... F,~ 
-PRETON & HARRIS, 
.. ,~ .... : ~ 19~~.q_ttorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
~~-·~·-··--··-··-~-------~~~ 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
c.A.CriE \T .. -\.LI.J£\T BANKINct-
C<lJIPANY, a l~tah corpora-
tion, a~ Executor of the Last 
Will and Testainent of WTI_.j-
L·'<)RJJ 'B._,. B..:\.l.GH, Deceased, 
Pla,intiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
C..:\._CHE COlJNTY POULTRY 
GROvVER'S ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation, a n d U T A H 
POULTRY & FARMERS CO-
OPERATI,rE, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondent. 
Appellant's 
I Brief 
Case No. 6860 
STATEl\iENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to a part 
of Block 5, J>lat "D" I.jogan City Survey, particularly 
described in the contplaint, against the defendants. The 
defendant l rtah T>oultry & Farmers Cooperative, by 
way of counterclain1, asked to have the adjoining tract 
of land to the South owned by it quieted in it, and in 
addition clain1ed a right of "\vay for foot, vehicular and 
anuual traffic. over a tract of land 16 1-2 feet wide, 
l'B t Prillg on l\1 ain Street in ].logan City and extending 
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West a distance of 175 feet. Its counterclaim sought to 
claiin this road,vay, both as a public road and by 
adverse use over a period of twenty-one years. The Court 
found there was no dedication of the strip of land as a 
public highway, but found in favor of the said defendant 
on the issues of adverse use, and adjudged the said 
· defendant to have a right of way over the 16 1-2 feet 
strip of land. From this judgn1ent the plaintiff prose-
cutes this appeal. 
STA'r~J~IENT OF FACTS 
About the year 1918 the Utah Idaho Central Rail-
road Company acquired a tract of land in Block 5 of 
Plat "D" of Logan City Survey, having a frontage of 
214 1-2 feet on :Niain Street and extending through the 
block to First West· Street. They also acquired ad-
ditional property to the South which they offered to sell 
to the Cache Valley Commission Company at cost, and 
invited the Cache \Talley Commission Company to build 
its ·w·arehouse adjoining the railroad company as a 
prospective major custon1er of the railroad. ( Tr. 212-
215). 
Defendant's Exhibit "3" is a map showing the 
location of the respective tracts of land and the tract 
over which the right of way is clairned is marked "CC." 
At the North appears the freighthouse of the U. I. C. 
Railroad Cornpany, on the South of '\Vhich is the loading 
and unloading platforn1s for custoi.ners, and on the 
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Southea~t a ~ntall rectangular tract was used as a 8cale 
house. Bet\YPen the ~ealP house and the North line of 
the defendant·~ property, a width of 16 1-2 feet and 
extending· \\,.. e~t 17j feet to the East line of defendant's 
w .. arehouse, is the tract in dispute. On the exhibit this is 
marked ~ .. C Disputed Right of Way C.'' Imn1ediately 
south of the disputed right of way is a tract 16 1-2 feet 
wide 1narked "• spur,' on the exhibit, and South of this 
last tract is \Yhat is marked ''The Utah Poultry Ware-
house,·' an open space between ''A'' and '' B,'' and a 
further warehouse to the West marked "whse." On the 
South of the l:tah Poultry is an alle~yway used by the 
defendant for ingress and egress of its customers to the 
platform entrance of its warehouse, and extending to the 
south is tract '' E,'' a right of way acquired and used by 
the defendant to reach Second South Street. (Tr 218) 
Defendant's warehouse has a loading and unloading 
platform on the South but none on the north. On the 
North were two doors for loading and unloading cars 
on the spur track. The main entrance was on the South. 
(Tr 220) 
The Cache Valley Commission Company accepted 
the invitation of the railroad company, purchased the 
tract now belonging to the defendant, built the ware-. 
houses a hove set forth, ·( '"rr 213) and conveyed to the 
railroad co1npany an ease1nent for a railroad track on 
the North side of the building. (Tr 214-216) The rail-
road co1npany constructed the spur track so that cars 
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could be spotted at t'vo doors on the north side of de-
fendant's building and loaded and unloaded at this 
point. rr,he~' also constructed plank crossings at points 
''A'' and '' B'' as shown on ''Exhibit 3'' for the 
convenience of the defendant's vehicles in crossing 
the defendant's yards into the railroad's freight yards 
to facilitate their freight business. (Tr 218-19) This 
spur was "approxin1ately three feet north of the build-
ing, the rails being approximately five feet apart and 
the ties being approxirnately eight feet long. The rails 
protruded above the level of the ground but the ties 
were approximately at the level of the ground. (Tr 194-5 
207-8) All of the tract of land owned by the railroad 
company, except that part occupied by buildings and 
spur tracks, was used as a freight yard, and was used 
by customers of the railroad cornpany in the coal busi-
ness, lumber business, and other businesses. The tract 
in dispute was graveled by the railroad company and 
was used by its customers, including the customers of 
the Commission Company, to go to the freight house to 
load and unload freight, and was like,vise used by the 
customers of the Cornmission Company and defendant to 
reach the defendant's pren1ises for their business with 
the defendant. There were no marks on the pren1ises 
to indicate a traveled road ( Tr 141) or division line 
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's tracts, and 
none of the "\Vitnesses appeared to know where the 
division line was ('l'~r 121-A, 151); but the plaintiff pro-
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duced a nu1uber of \vitiH:'~~e~ \vho testified to having 
driven over the track to do business with the defendant. 
About the y~ar 19-±:2, the Poultry l'to1npany acquired 
the property of the l'aehe 'Talley Con11nission Company; 
and in 1~l4 7 the 1T. I. C. Railroad Co1npany went out of 
buint·s~ and the plaintiff'8 te~tate purchased the above 
tract. ....\bstract8 of title were introduced, and both 
parties established their respective record titles to the 
tracts as described in the con1plaint. ( Tr 90, 131). 
There was a boundary question involving one foot of 
land brought out at the trial. This was no part of the 
claimed right of "'~ay and was adjusted from th.e ab-
stracts, and no further mention will be made as to this 
one foot of land. 
''Then ~fr. Baugh undertook to remove the freight 
house and to' construct a building on the property pur-
chased, the defendant asserted a right of way over the 
disputed tract and this suit resulted. All of defendant's 
\vitnesses testified that they drove over the tract at 
their convenience an.d without being molested or inter-
ferred with by the plaintiff or his predecessors in in-
terest. They testified that it 'vas customary to enter 
from Main Street on the East on one side of the defend-
ant's building, drive to the rear and around the building, 
and out to the East on the other side. They could, at 
any tiine, drive through the track marked '' E '' out to 
Second South Street. Over plaintiff's objection they 
were not perinitted hy the Court to testify whether the 
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travel over the disputed tract was with permission of 
the railroad company. 
George Bowen, president of the Cache 'lalley 
Commission Company during all of the time from 1918 
to 1942 when it sold to defendant (rrr 212), testified that 
the relationship between the railroad company and the 
Cache Valley Comn1ission Company was a friendly 
relationship; that the Cache Valley Commission was a 
large customer of the railroad; that the use by the 
Cache Valley Commission Company of the tract was not 
with any intention of acquiring a right of way by 
prescription; that at times cars were spotted on the 
tracks for days at a time in such manner that the travel 
was blocked by the two tracks (Tr 220); that the Cache 
Valley Commission Cornpany first erected the large 
front building and after World War I they erected the 
rear building marked '' whse'' ; that the two were con-
structed on a line so as to permit a third section between 
and make it one building in a straight line clear through 
(Tr 217); that the Cache Valley Commission Company 
had a contract with the coal company to use their scales 
for weighing loads (Tr 219); and that vehicles might 
enter on the south and turn around and go back out the 
same way. (~rr 221) Nir. Bowen testified: 
'' Q Cache V alle~,r Cornn1ission Company-
did use the area C 'Yhich is marked 'disputed 
right-of-way'~ 
..._t\. -Yes, sir. 
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(~ \Yhy did you use itt 
~-\ \Yell, \Yt\ felt free to use any of that area 
in there clear over as far as the railroad plat-
fornl. In fact \Ye were even carrying shipments 
of freight fron1 their pla tfor1n over to our north 
\\~arehouse door back and forth, and we had con-
nections back and forth all the time. 
Q ---:\nd those connections were of mutual 
benefit to your business as well as the U. I. C. 1 
A Yes, sir. 
Q When you used it did you ever do so with 
the intention of acquiring a right-of-way by pre~ 
scriptive easement~ 
A No sir. 
:ThJR. YOUNG: I object to that as incom-
petent, irrevelant, and immaterial. Has no 
authority shown by this witness to bind the cor-
poration.'' 
ASSIGNl\fENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Court erred in Inaking its Finding of Fact 
number five and the whole thereof. 
2. The Court erred in making that part of Finding 
of Fact number five finding as a fact that the use by 
the defendant of the disputed tract was adverse. 
3. rPhE Court erred in making that part of Finding 
of Fact number five finding as a fact that the adverse 
use was with the knowledge of the o'\\rner of the property. 
4. rrhe Court erred in Illaking that part of Finding 
of .Fact nu1nher five that the defendant used the tract 
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for foot and anintal traffic. 
5. The Court erred in failing to find from the undis-
puted evidence that any use of the prentises by de-
fendant or its customers was a per1nissive use. 
6. The Court erred in failing to rind from the undis-
puted evidence that any use of the premises by 
defendant and its predecessors and customers was 
wholly without any notice to the plaintiff and its 
predecessors that the same was under clairn of right or 
by way of adverse use. 
7. The Court erred in Inaking Conclusion of Law 
number three and the whole thereof. 
8. The Court erred in :q1aking Conclusion of La\\~ 
number four and the whole thereof. 
9. The Court erred in making Conclusion of Law 
number six and the whole thereof. 
10. The Court erred in entering that portion of its 
judgment and decree contained in paragraph three of 
the decree that defendant is the owner of an ease-
ment over the tract described in the said decree for foot, 
vehicular and animal traffic, or at all. 
11. The Court erred in entering that part of its 
judgment and decree in paragraph four enjoining the 
plaintiff and the persons clain1ing through Wilford F. 
Baugh frorn interferring with the said easernent. 
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12. The Court erred in failing and refusing to enter 
judg1uent in fa,·or of the plaintiff and against the de;. 
fendant <.tuieting plaintiff"s title to the entire tract de-
~cribed in paragraph one of the decree. 
13. '1~he Court erred in sustaining the defendant's 
objection to the question asked the witness John Neider-
hauser on cross-exa1uination, by plaintiff's counsel, as 
follo"~s: 
· ~ Q .. A .. nd so far as you know when you used it 
and other people used it, it was used with per-
mission of the railroad con1pany to facilitate 
their freight business~ 
:JlR. YOUKG: I object to that as calling for a 
conclusion of the witness 
THE COURT: Sustained." (Tr 119) 
14. The Court erred in sustaining the defendant's 
objection to the question asked the witness H W. Bal-
:~i lard, on cross-exan1ination, by pl,aintiff's counsel, as 
follows: 
'' Q A.ll right, plank crossings over their own 
railroad for exit, ingress, and egress on the 
property of your company-I'm talking about 
this cornpany-so that your custo1ners could cross 
oveT into the railroad property, don't you think 
that any travel in the area C was by permission of 
the railroad~ 
~IR. CI_jA vVSON: J"ust a Ininute. we object 
to that as calling for the conclusion-
'rHE COliRT: "Sustained." (11r 160-61) 
15. rrhe (iourt erred in sustaining the defendant's 
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objection to the question asked the witness I.Jewis Bowen, 
on Cross-exainination, by plaintiff's counsel, as follows: 
'' Q And if they went further over to the 
other property, so far as you knew they were 
travelling with the consent of the railroad com-
pany~ 
MR. YOUNG: 1 object to that as calling for 
a conclusion. 
THE COURT: ''Sustained.'' (Tr 188) 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that the evidence in this case 
wholly fails to sustain either the Findings of Fact that the 
use of the tract in question was adverse or under claim 
of right or that plaintiff had any knowledge of such ad-
verse use or claim of right; that the Findings of Fact do 
not find sufficient facts to sustain the Conclusions of 
Law that defendant was and is the owner of an ease-
Inent described in the Judgment; and that the Judgment 
awarding such easement is contrary to law. The 
Assignments of Error numbers one to twelve inclusive 
cover the propositions above mentioned and, therefore, 
may be discussed together. 
I 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE 1JSE OF 
THE TRACT IN QtTESTION WAS A_DVERSE OR 
UNDER CLAIM OF RIGHT OR THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF STJCH FACTS. 
Since there appears to be no in1portant or sub-
stantial conflict in the testirnony, no useful purpose 
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eould he ~erYed by analyzing the testimony of each 
\ritness, but in general the evidence shows that the de-
fendant produeed a~ \vitne~ses tvvo for1ner e1nployees of 
the Cache \Talley Counnission l~oinpan,v-J ohn Neider-
hau8er and Le,vis Bo,ven-and a nu1nber of its members 
as \Yitnesses in the case. All of these witnesses, includ-
ing the two en1ployees, testified in substance that on 
nun1erous occasions \vhen they went to the defendant's 
place of business as custo1ners they, at times, 'drove 
around the defendant's building and either went in or 
out over a portion of the disputed tract. Most of these 
·witnesses testified that the tract between the U. I. C. 
freighthouse and the defendant's building looked like a 
roadway, but on cross-exa1nination each one of them 
also stated that it looked like a freight yard. There is no 
dispute in the evidence but that the main entrance to the 
defendant's place of business was on the South of their 
_:building, that the railroad's freighthouse had its main 
delivery platfor1n on the South side, and that all local 
freight was called for and delivered to railroad custom-
er~ on the South side of their freighthouse, and that they 
used this freig·ht ~vard as the means of ingress and 
egress to the freighthouse. 
Likewise, it is undisputed in the evidence tha~ there 
w-as nothing on the prernises to 1nark the division line 
between the two properties, and none of the witnesses 
kne'\\r where the division line was. Neither did the 
witnesses know whether they were on the railroad 
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property or <)n the property of the Cache \Talley Com-
nlission Company. The "ritnesses usually stated they 
traveled along adjoining the tracks north of the de-
fendant's building. (Tr 146-7). 
There is not one word of evidence in the record 
that anybody ever traveled over the disputed tract on 
foot or drove animals over the sarne but (apparently 
for good rneasure) the Court in its Judgment awarded 
an easement ''for foot, vehicular and animal traffic.'' 
Likewise, the testimony of George Bowen, a witness 
for the plaintiff, who was the manager of the Cache 
'Talley Comrnission Company, was undisputed: (Tr 212-
228). 
(a) That the Cache \;--alley Commission Company 
purchased its property frorn the railroad company and 
built its warehouse at the request of the railroad com-
pany; that they weighed on the railroad or coal com-
pany scales by arrangements with the company; and 
that all their relationships were friendly and in an effort 
to jointly build up their respective businesses. 
(b) That it was the plan of the company~ to build a 
warehouse between the t\vo buildings, which would 
effectively destroy any clain1ed use of this right of way. 
(e) ']~hat it was possible to turn around and go out 
on the South ~ide of the Cache \~alley Connnission Coin-
pany building, and likewise the l 1ache \Talley Con1mis-
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sion (\nnpany aequired a Right of Way fron1 the South 
~idP of their propPrty to 2nd South St. and traffic 
could go in on th~ South side of the Cache Valley Corn-
lni::;sion {_~on1pany building (their principal loading and 
unloading plarP of business) and drjve thence South on 
2nd South St. 
(d) That they never used any part of the claimed 
Righ of ''"'" ay 'vith intent to claim the Right of Way; this 
testin1ony being undisputed and this witness being the 
principal 'vitness knowing about these matters we must 
then establish conclusively that until 1941 at least the 
use was pern1issive and that there was no adverse use of 
the claimed Right of Way. 
In other words, the only showing made by the de-
fendant's witnesses was an actual use of portions of the 
disputed tract for ingress and egress to the defendant's 
:;jj premises. There is no evidence \vhatever that this use 
was adverse or under claim of right or was not per~ 
missive and the only positive evidence is that the use was 
permissive and not adverse; and there is no evidence one 
\vay or the other that the railroad cornpany had any 
knowledge that the persons who used the right of way 
were not crossing over the tract as customers of the 
railroad Co1npany rather than as customers of the Com-
mission company. 
II 
TI-l~ E'INDINGS OF FACT DO NOT FIND FACTS 
lTPON WI-JICH, lTNDER L ... \ W OF THIS STATE, A 
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JlTDGM~JNre OF, ADVJ1JRSE USE CAN BE SUS-
TAINED. 
It should be re1nernbered that this property is owned 
and used by a public utility and presents an entirely 
different set of circumstances than the ordinary case 
of an easernent by prescription. It is not to be pre-
sumed that the railroad cornpany, a public utility under 
duty to serve every mernber of the public without dis-
crimination or without selecting its customers, could 
"ride herd" on all persons using its freig_ht yards and 
premises to inquire whether or not they were customers 
or prospective customers of the railroad or of·- some of 
the railroad's neighbor customers, or whether or not 
they were on the premises under some claim of right 
adverse to the railroad company; and this is particularly 
true where the Cache Valley Commission Company was 
one of the principal customers of the railroad company 
and had been invited to build near the railroad company 
for convenience in shipping its freight. 
One of the first early Utah cases discussing the 
subject of easement by prescription was the case of 
Harkness vs. Woodmansee, 7 U t. 227, 26 Pac 291: 
' 'Where a person opens a way for the use of 
hi8 own premises, and another person uses it also 
without causing damage, the presumption is, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such 
use by the latter was permissive, and not under a 
claim of right.'' 
The case of Jensen vs. -Gerrard, 85 lT tah 481, 39 P. 
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~d 1070~ i~ another on tht.• n1atter of Burden of Proof, 
and points out that adverse use can not be sustained 
\vhen it re::5ts upon a license or 1nere neighborly or busi-
ness accomodation. 
In the case of Bertolina vs. Frates, 57 Pac 2d 346, at 
page 348, the court Inakes the following staten1ents: 
''There is a mass of evidence in the record 
tending to establish that numerous people besides 
the defendants have traveled as occasion required 
over the alleged Right of Way, but that evidencP 
is immaterial in this case. Where a person 
claims to have acquired an easement by prescrip-
tion over another's land, he must show that h~ 
has acquired it by his own continuous, open, un~ 
interrupted and adverse user under claim of 
right for the twenty-year prescriptive period. 
The prescriptive right is based originally upon 
the theory of a grant implied from long use. Funk 
v. Anderson, 22 Utah 238, 61 P. 1006. It runs to 
the individual and not to the public. Mr. Wash-
born, in his work on Easements (4th Ed.) 43, P. 
164, says: ''But one can not claim a right of way 
as a private one by showing that it had been used 
by the proprietors of other lots than his own. He 
must show a user by himself or his predecessors 
of the way to his o\vn lot under a claim of right 
for the requisite period of time, continuously, by 
the acquiescence of the owner of the land over 
which it lies." 
''A user by an individual which is not dis-
tinguished from that of the public will be con-
~idered permissive and not adverse unless there 
is evidence that it was under a claim of right in 
hirnself and that the owner knou1ing of such claim 
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acquiesced ilfi ,it. Authorities should be unneces-
~ax~' to denton~trate that principle. The 1nere 
state1nent of the conditions under which the pre-
scriptive right rnay be acquired negatives the 
idea of the user of others either adding to or 
detracting fro1n the rights of a particular 
clain1ant. '' 
All of the above cases are strongest in favor of the 
defendant because the land clain1ed in each case appar-
ently had no other use than the use of a road to go from 
one place to another, while the land now sought to be 
claimed was a part of a larger freight yard and there 
was nothing to mark its boundaries, and there is now no 
evidence to mark the boundary or to sustain a boundary 
line of the claimed easement. 
"Where an easeinent is acquired by prescrip-
tion the extent of the right is fixed by and de-
termined by the user in 'vhich it originated • • • 
an easement acquired by prescription can not be 
extended except by an .. adverse user which has 
been acquiesced in for the requisite length of time 
* * * " 2s c.J·.s. 751. 
In the case of Bolton vs. ~furphy, 41 Utah 
591, 127 Pac 335 this Court says : 
' 'Appellants are li1ni ted to the use they made 
of the same (rl.ght of way) the lasat 20 years~ 
that is, the 20 years innnediately preceding the 
thne of the objection to the use thereof by respon-
dents. The nature or character of the use of an 
easement rna)! be changed, PROVIDED THE 
CH.A.NGJ~J C~ONTINlT.BJS T_j()NO· EN01TGH TO 
GI'll~J A PRJ~SCRIP~ri\FE RIGHT." 
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If undPr th~ evidence in this case the defendants cau 
prevail for a prescriptive right over 16 1-2 feet of the 
plaintiff·s property, it would seen1 that there is no limit 
to the an1ount that they Inight claim, with the exceptions 
of w·here buildings '\vere located. The testimony 
sho,Yed that they on occasions used the scale house and 
on other occasions used and drove through the scale 
house and drove around through the coal yards, and 
there is no distinction bet\veen any of the evidence in-
dicating that one 'vas any n1ore under claiin of right than 
the other, and it is not the law that business property 
used by the owner and its customers as such must be 
subjected to private easements anywhere customers of 
the business concern may have driven, under such 
flimsy evidence positively denied by the witness, Bowen, 
as we have in this case. To permit the defendant to 
prevail on the claimed prescriptive theory in this case 
would be equivalent to holding that every railroad yard 
or public utility yard in the State of Utah could not be 
changed, nor could buildings be erected thereon by the 
utility if their customers had happened to drive over 
this yard or n1ake use of the yard in their business for 20 
years. 
III 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE BRING THE CASE 
WITH THE CAS~jS BEGINNING WITH HARK-
NESS \rS 'VOOD~1ANSEE AND ENDING WITH 
SAV.A.G-J1J VS NIFjl.4SEN, NOT WITHIN THE DOC-
TRINE O:B~ ZOIJLINGER 'TS FRANK. 
The facts in the cases of Zollinger vs. Frank, 175 
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Pac 2nd, 714, referred to in the later case of Dahnken vs. 
George Rontney and Sons Contpany 184 P. 2d 211, are 
clear}~· distinguished fron1 the case at bar, and there-
fore the rules announced therein have no application 
here. The facts in both those cases brought them within 
the rule that where the use of the RIGHT OF WAY 
is so well established for the prescriptive period that a 
fair assumption can be n1ade that it was under a clain1 
of right (or against the o"\\rner) the burden shifts· to the 
owner to show that the use 'vas per1nissive. We have 
no fault to find with this rule in a proper case. In the 
Zollinger case the right of way was fenced, and used only 
for road purposes and a ditch; the owner used only a. 
part of the road while the claimant used it all and used 
it more than the owner and made repairs on it at the 
request of the owner. 
In the Dahnken vs. Ron1ney case the narrow strip, 
apparently about 10 feet wide, over which the easement 
., was granted was the only 1neans of access to the rear of 
:. , 
· · the buildings on the do1ninant estate, so that the case 
discusses quite at length the n1atter of way of necessity. 
It was used for that purpose for forty years and there 
was no question in the case about the owner of the 
servient estate not being able to determine that such 
us~ was being Inade by people not the custon1ers of 
such owner; and no question of a public utility is in-
volved in that case. 
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Thert~ are no sneh facts in this case. The property 
was not u~ed a~ a road,vay but as a freight yard., there 
was no fence 1narking its boundaries as a roadway, the 
Railroad could have no \Yay to deter1nine whether per-
~ons using it "~ere custo1ners of the Railroad or of the 
Cache \ 7 alley Connnission Co1npany. The railroad was 
intere~ted in getting as n1uch custom from the Com-
ntission Con1pany and its patrons as possible. It wanted 
them to use its freight yard to bring freight business 
to it. It "~as likewise interested in both present and 
prospective custo1ners. It would have taken a whole 
eorps of detectives and office hands to keep track of 
every person entering its freight yards to inquire and 
keep record whether they were there on business with 
the Railroad or 'vith the Commission Company. No case 
has been cited or found that it is a duty of a public 
utility to accost every person making use of its freight 
yard to determine the nature of their visit and just 
where they were going or why or under what claim they 
are entering over one portion of the freight yards in-
stead of another. Such a rule would tend to destroy all 
railroad freight business. Nor has any case been found 
or cited that held the use of a roalroad freight yard is 
not permissive. 
If the use of this freight yard is not presumed to be 
permissive to every member of the public who is a bona-
fide eustorner or a prospective customer (and all mem-
bers of the public are prospective customers of a rail-
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road) then the railroad is obliged (under penalty of 
being deprived of the right to change the n1anner of the . 
use of their property) to post notice that only cus-
tomers and prospective custoiners are per1nitted to 
enter their freight yard and to ernploy enough people 
to police the san1e to ascertain that those making use of 
the yard did not co1ne within this category. but . were 
sirnply mernbers of the public using the same to get to 
their destination; and that destination was not on the 
railroad Cou1pany 's pre1nises. This burden upon any 
railroad or public service coinpany· or other business 
concern doing business \\'ith large proportions of the 
public would be unworkable, unjust and unconstitutional 
as taking property without due process of law. .All 
these Inatters and rules clearly distinguish this case 
from the rule in the Zollinger case. 
It was not the -intention of the Supreme Court in 
the Zollinger case to adopt a rule that every crossing by 
one person of the property of anqther (much less the 
property of a public utility eorporation provided by 
the Railroad for the use of its customers) is presumed to 
be adverse and under claim of right any 1nore than a 
crossing by one n1e1nber of a fa1nily of property of 
another rne1nber of the family is presumed to be ad-
verse. ·Any such rule would require every utility to 
post signs that no one but custo1ners of the Railroad 
were to be admitted and then to police their yards 
provided for the public to see that all users ,vere therP 
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for prt\~ent business \vith the Railroad. No 8Uch facts 
appear in the Zollinger or Dahnken cases. There 
is nothing in either of these cases that would indicate 
that the users of a Right of Way by the claimants ever 
had any business or other relations of any kind with the 
o'\vners so that the assumption could fairly be made that 
the owners knew each use was for the benefit of the 
clain1ant and 'vas not a customer of the owner. 
In both the Zollinger and Dahnken cases the tracts 
of land in dispute 'vere apparently used for no other 
purpose than as a right of way and each case contained 
a discussion that the contested strip might have been 
a way _of necessity for the dominant estate. In the case 
at bar it should be remembered that the defendant 
owns and now uses as a right of way 16 1-2 feet north 
of their building. No attempt was made to show this to 
be inadequate. The mere use by driving over portions 
of the freight yard under the peculiar circumstances 
in this case without one word of positive evidence of 
any intention by anybody at the time of such use to 
acquire a right of way by adverse use is not enough to 
create such right. To permit them now to move over 
and claim a right of way over 16 1-2 feet of this freight 
yard without any offer of compensation to the owner is 
an injustice that should shock the good conscience of any 
court. 
This court in the last case on this subject, Savage 
vs Nielsen 197 P. 2d 117 recognized the rule that not 
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every use ol' a clain1ed easernent 1s presurned to be 
adverse. 1~here the U8e was held to be by permissive 
and the court said that: 
'"It is apparent frorn this testirnony that the 
use began as perinisHive· use and was used in 
acknowledgrnent of a ~uperior right and title first 
in the father, Albert Savage, and later in the . 
brother, Gordon Savage. In 8hort, then, the facts 
have put this case within the rule set out in J en-
sen v. Gerrard, supra, where it was said (85 Utah 
481, 39 P. 2d 107-3) ; 
''A twenty-yeat· use alone of a way is not 
suff-icient to establish an easement. Mere use of 
a roadway opened by a landowner for his own 
purposes will be presumed permissive. An an-
tagonistic or adverse use of a way cannot spring 
fron~ a permissive use. A prescriptive title must 
be acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when 
it rests upon a license or mere neighborly accom-
nlodation. Adverse user is the antithesis of per-
missive user. If the use is accompanied by any 
recognition in express terms or by implication of 
a right in the lando\vner to stop such use now or 
at some tirne in the future, the use is not ad-
verse.'' 
See also: Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 
Utah 142, 158 P. 684. 
There can be no doubt that the use by the Com-
mission Con1pany began as a· custo1ner of the Railroad 
and was by permission in the beginning There is abso-
lutely nothing in the record to show any fact called to 
the attention of the Railroad that an~'"one was using their 
freight yards under any clain1 that it -vvas a road or that 
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they 'vere using it adverse})·. 
rrhe facts then bring this case \Vithin the rule an-
nounced in the case of Savage vs. Nielsen (supra) and 
the t~ases cited therein, and not within the Zollinger 
ea~e above. Neither did the Zollinger case overrule the 
case~ beginning \vith Harkness vs. Woodmansee and 
ending with the case of Savage vs. Nielsen above. 
If the court should feel that the burden in this case 
did shift to the plaintiff in this case then the undisputed 
testimony of the witness, Bowen, fully settled that 
burden, for the substance of his testimony was that the 
b,~o companies were friendly working to build up their 
respective businesses together, and that the Commission 
Company was one of the Railroad's largest shippers, 
and that whatever use they made was a permissive use 
and \\'"as without any intent to claim an adverse use of 
any of the property in the Railroad freight yards. 
The clailn of prescriptive right of way must fail 
because the evidence clearly establishes : 
That the disputed property was not a right 
of way, but a freight yard. 
That there was no use of any right of way 
by the defendant and its predecessor in interest 
that was not entirely consistent with its use as a 
freight yard. 
That there was no evidence that the use was 
uninterrupted. The undisputed evidence was 
that it was at times interrupted for days at a time 
hy freight cars. 
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There is no evidence that the use was ad-
verse. It was clearly the use of an invitee of 
property opened by a public utility for a freight 
yard for the u~e of its custou1ers and it is pre-
sunled permissive. 
'l1here is no evidence thaf a use beginning 
as perrnissive was ever transferred into an ad-
verse use under claiin of right. 
There is no evidence that the railroad ever 
had knowledge of any facts that would put it 
on notice that any use was inconsistent with 
the purpose for which it was provided, to-wit, 
as a freight yard customer, or under any claim 
of right. · ,.j 
. ~ 
IV 
REFUSAI_j OF E\TIDENCE ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Assignments of error 13, 14, and 15 all go to the 
question of the ruling of the court sustaining defen-
dant's objection to questions put to their witnesses on 
cross-exan1ination, viz: 
(13) And so far as you know, when you used 
it and other people used it, it was with the per-
nlission of the Railroad Con1pany to facilitate 
their freight business~ ( Tr 119) 
(14) Don't, you think that any travel in the 
area '' C '' was by perrnission of the Railroad 6? 
(Tr 161) 
(15) So far as you kne'v they were travel-
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ling \Yith the eon~ent of the Railroad Con1pany1 
(Tr 188) 
The objection in each case \Vas that the question 
called for the conclusion of the 'vitness and was 
sustained by the court. 
With the possible exception of question 14 it is sub-
mitted that the questions do not call for a conclusion of 
the witnesses, but "rere merely put to test his knowledge 
or to inquire into the status of his knowledge about the 
subject he had testified to. Each witness had testified 
about the travel over the tract and the question as to 
his knowledge as to how this travel was arranged, was 
clearly proper cross-examination. 
But it is further contended that the questions were 
proper cross examination, irrespective of whether or 
not they called for the opinion or conclusion of the 
witness. 
The general rule is that cross examination should 
be permitted a wide latitude. 
"In accordance with the rule permitting a 
wide latitude in the cross-examination of a wit-
ness, the trial court in the exercise of its discre-
tion as to the scope and extent of cross-examina~ 
tion should endeavor to extend, rather t~an re-
strict, such latitude~ and accordingly the right 
to cross-exan1ination should not be lightly cur-
tailed, nor the cross-examination be unduly re-
strjcted or limited and any undue restriction or 
limitation on the seope and extent of the cross-
examination is error." (70 C.J-., page 621.) 
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''--·as a general ruh~, any 1natter is a proper 
subject of cro~H-exarnination \vhich is responsive 
to testilnony given on direct exarnination, and 
which tends to elucidate, Inodify, explain, contra-
uict, or rebut testirnony given in chief by the wit-
ness, or which tends to elucidate, qualify, or rebut 
any logical inference resulting fro1n such testi-
rnony that tends to support in any degree the 
opposite side of the case; and it has been held 
that anything within the witness' knowledge tend-
ing to rebut the evidence on direct exarnination is 
admissable as a rnatter of right on cross-examina-
tion." (70 C. J·., page 623-5) 
''Where facts from \-vhich an inference un-
favorable to the party is drawn are elicited fron1 
a witness, everything within the knowledge of 
the witness_ tending to rebut such an inference is 
admissible on cross-exarnination, even if collater-
al; and, where a statement testified to in chief 
admits of two inferences, it is the proper function 
of cross-exan1ination to eliminate the inference 
which is unfavorable to the party against whom 
the witness testified." (70 C. J., page 638.) 
In each case the witness, under cross-exarnination. 
testified to travelling over the disputed tract. While 
none of them testified that they travelled over the tract 
with a claim of right or adversely that was the inference 
contended for and only purpose the defendant could have 
in putting thern on the stand. It is our contention, there-
fore, that their testimony \Vas susceptible of the infer-
~nce that either the travel -vvas by consent or under claim 
of right. It is difficult to eonceive of 1nore appropriate 
cioss-exarnination than to inquire if the unfavorable 
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.ltfertJnt~ \YH8 not the propPr inference according to the 
hest kno\Yledge of the witness. Additional question~ 
n1ight haYe been asked a8 to the source of his knowledge 
if the (1ue8tion had been ans\vered in the negative. 
In the case of Cahoon vs. vVest, 20 lTtah 73, 57 Pac. 
715, the witness testified that he was the person who 
n1ade a Bill of Sale in evidence. On cross examination 
the court sustained objection to questions concerning the 
property mentioned in the Bill of Sale. Held this was 
reversable error : 
Quoting from Wharton on Evidence the court said: 
'• A witness may be cross-examined as to his 
examination in chief as to all its bearings * * • On 
cross-examination counsel should be allowed a 
free range within the subject matter of the direct 
examination and a wide latitude should be given 
to a party who has to prove a negative * * • The 
cross exan1ination of a witness should not be con-
fined strictly to the precise subjects called to his 
attention upon his direct examination, but should 
be allowed to extend to any matter, not foreign to 
the subject matter pf such examination tending to 
limit, explain or modify." 
In the case of Rasmussen vs. Sevier Valley Canal 
Company, 40 lTtah 371, 121 Pac. 741, the witness testified 
that he made a certain book entry and the issue was as 
to his authority to make the san1e. On cross-examina-
tion the court sustained an objection to the question, 
HYou Ina~' state how you ca1ne to n1ake the entry~" 
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In holding this ruling to he error the eourt says at 
page 745: 
"Counsel for respondent, however, seeks to 
~ustain the ruling of the court upon the ground 
that the question was not proper cross-examina-
tion. In this eontention, \Ve think counsel is in 
error. It had been shown that the witness made 
the entry in the book and when he rnade it. We 
think, in view of this, re:::;pondent had opened up 
the subject so as to perrnit appellant's counsel to 
inquire eoncerning the cj reu1nstances under which 
the entry WAS MAD:Bj AND BY \TIRTUE OF 
WHAT ~-\.UTHORITY, IF ANY, THE WIT-
NESS ACTFJD. .;:-'\t least a part of the inquiry 
which was directed to the witness by respondent's 
counsel had son1e relation to the authority under 
which he made the entry. If such was not the 
purpose of the inquiry, it had none.'' 
It is true the word conclusion 'vas not rnentioned in 
the opinion, but it is contended that if there was a 
conclusion involved at all, it is the kind of conclusion that 
must be proper if the rules for liberal cross-examina-
tion are to be sustained. It would seem that the same 
rule that prevents a person frorn proving his case by 
asking a witness for his conclusions, does not have the 
same application "\\rhere the question is asked on cross-
examination. Cross-exarnination often calls for admis-
sions that n1ight be entirely irnproper on direct exarni-
nation. 
It is respectfully subrnitted that the rulings in 
these three instances deprived the plaintiff of substan· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
tial right~ of cro8s exa1nination, and were reversiblP 
~rror. 
In vie,\· of the fact that there are no 1naterial 
dispute~ in the testi1nony, no useful purpose could be 
~erved by a re-trial of this 1natter; and it is, therefore, 
re~pectfully sulnnitted that the case should be reversed 
and the Trial Court directed to enter its judgment 
quieting the title in the plaintiff of its property des-
cribed in the co1nplaint, free frou1 any clain1ed easement 
by the defendant 
PRESTON & HARRIS, 
---~ttorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
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